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K
A R A T UAL-HISTORICAL 
Randy E. Barnett* 
Kurt Lash believes that, in rights, the Ninth 
Amendment protects collective or majoritarian rights as well. In this essay I 
explain 
ma
the
oth
Am
ind
Con
firs
inte
use
inte
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When it comes to interpreting the Ninth Amendment, Kurt Lash and I 
agree about many important issues—  to enumerate here. But 
Lash has an idée fixe: majoritarianis e believes in a retained 
collecti
ma
co
 
URT LASH’S MAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTY 
 ESPONSE TO EXT
THEORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT  
 addition to individual natural 
why his majoritarian vision is contrary to the antimajoritarianism of the 
n who devised the Ninth Amendment, James Madison, and those who wrote 
 Constitution. Not coincidentally, it is contrary to the individualism of the 
er amendments in the Bill of Rights, and to the public meaning of the Ninth 
endment as it was received during its ratification. It is also contrary to the 
ividualist conception of popular sovereignty adopted in the text of the 
stitution as interpreted by a four-to-one majority of the Supreme Court in its 
t major constitutional decision. And it is contrary to the individualist 
rpretation of the Ninth Amendment by the one source he cites who actually 
s the word “collective”: St. George Tucker. In sum, the collectivist 
rpretation of the phrase “others retained by the people” is anachronistic—a 
jection of contemporary majoritarianism onto a text that is and was most 
urally read as referring to the natural rights retained by all individuals, and to 
e rights alone. 
INTRODUCTION 
indeed, too many
m. In particular, h
ve right of the people to majoritarian rule or a collective right of the 
jority to rule—or something like this; he is not clear. So powerful is his 
mmitment to this idea that it sometimes bends his interpretation of the 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law 
nter. I thank Larry Solum for his comments on an earlier draft.  Ce
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ious evidence he discusses to support his belief that the Ninth Amendment 
iginally referred to “collective” majoritarian rights. 
Consider this. By my count, the word “majoritarian” 
twenty-four times. And the number of times the term appears in any of 
 authorities he cites? My count is zero. The term “majoritarian” is a modern 
m, not one found in the original sources,1 but neither do any of his sources 
er to the “majority” or “majority rule.” Likewise, Lash uses the term 
ollective” to describe rights thirty times, though it appears in his sources just 
ce, in a quote from St. George Tucker.2  
While there is no doubt that the Founders believed in majoritarian 
vernance, this does not entail the belief that electoral majorities had a 
llective right to violate the retained rights of individuals. As will be 
plained below, James Madison and other Federalists came to believe that the 
lation of individual rights by majorities in the states under the Articles of 
nfederation had revealed majority rule to be a problem that needed to be 
lved by the Constitution and Bill of Rights, not a right to be affirmed by the 
nth Amendment. 
Following Akhil Amar’s collectivist reading of the Bill of Rights as a 
ole,3 Lash reads the 
 allows that the rights retained by the people include individual natural 
hts, all his writings to date emphasize the collective right of the majority to 
vern in the states. Some versions of his mantra include “the people’s 
llective right to regulate marriage,”4 “collective revolutionary rights,”5 “the 
ople’s collective right to regulate speech on a state level,”6 “collective 
ajoritarian rights,”7 and “retained collective or majoritarian rights.”8 The last 
rmulation sounds a variation on the collectivist theme that he also employs 
eatedly: majoritarian rights. Other such references include, “majoritarian 
1. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 232 (2d ed. 1989) (reporting no usage before 
18); MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ 19
majoritarian (providing an origin date of 1942). 
2. e i I. 
(1 a lt
rig claims that the rights in the Bill of 
Rights w e majorities in the states rather than minorities, an entirely 
differen
pro
“h
ser
hav
RE
Se nfra Part II
3. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
998). Amar’s descriptive thesis is lso difficu  to pin down exactly. Sometimes he reads 
hts themselves collectively; other times he merely 
er  intended to protect 
t proposition. Compare id. at 26 (referring to a “collective right of We the People” 
tected by the First Amendment), with id. at 21 (referring to the First Amendment’s 
istorical and structural core” as “safeguard[ing] the rights of popular majorities”). Any 
ious attempt to sort this out would require a separate treatment. Suffice it to say that I 
e become increasingly skeptical of the accuracy of his collectivist account. 
4. Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. 
V. 906, 915 (2008). 
5. Id. at 909. 
6. Id. at 912. 
7. Id. at 923. 
8. Id. at 924. 
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ocratic rights,”  a “majoritarian right” to “regulate religion at a local 
el,”10 “state majoritarian rights,”11 “individual and majoritarian rights,”12 
d “the majoritarian right to local self-government.”13 How exactly a 
ollective” right of the people as a whole relates to “majoritarian” rights is left 
examined. 
The nature and sc
ve right belonging to the people as a group is not the same as a right of a 
jority to govern. The connection between the concepts of “collective” and 
ajority” is never explained. A power of states or majorities to control or 
ulate individual rights is not the same as a state or majority right to control 
ividuals. The formulations of this purported right that I offered in the 
ening paragraph are mere guesses. Of course, if even a single one of his 
torical sources had named this right, it might have been easier to evaluate its 
ntent by examining the source. Instead, every one of the formulations quoted 
ove is Lash’s and he never clearly identifies or defines the right or rights he 
s in mind. 
When he does, as I expect he will, he needs to explain how it differs from 
 Guarantee C
ee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government.”14 
tice that a republican form of government is not the same as a majoritarian 
vernment, at least as evidenced by the U.S. Constitution itself. And even 
fore the Constitution was adopted, most states had begun adopting new 
nstitutions that emulated its tripartite structure, making them much less 
joritarian than they had previously been. Did this violate the Ninth 
endment, or did the fact these constitutions were adopted by a majority 
tisfy the Ninth Amendment? Without a clearer formulation of this alleged 
ht, it is impossible to say. 
But this is just the start of Kurt Lash’s majoritarian difficulty. In my most 
ent writing on the Ninth Amendment, I examine five proposed models of the 
endment’s original meaning. 
y supports the individual rights and federalism models and directly 
utes the state law and residual rights models, while seriously undermining 
 collective rights model to which Amar and Lash adhere.15 In this essay, I 
ll add to this analysis by showing that Lash’s collective and/or majoritarian 
ion of the Ninth Amendment as now described in A Textual-Historical 
9. Id. at 909. 
10. Id. at 911. 
11. Id. at 917-18. 
12. Id. at 919. 
13.
14. , § 4. 
15. ett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (2006)
Id. at 923. 
SU. . CONST. art. IV
See Randy E. Barn
. 
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ory of the Ninth Amendment is contrary to text, structure, and evidence of 
torical meaning. 
Lash’s majoritarian v
vised the Ninth Amendment, James Madison,16 and those who wrote 
 Constitution.17 Not coincidentally, it is contrary to the individualism of the 
er amendments constituting the Bill of Rights18 and the public meaning of 
 Ninth Amendment as it was received during its ratification.19 It is also 
ntrary to the individualist conception of popular sovereignty adopted in the 
t of the Constitution as interpreted by a four-to-one majority of the Supreme 
urt in its first major constitutional decision.20 And it is contrary to the 
ividualist interpretation of the Ninth Amendment by the one source he cites 
o actually uses the word “collective”: St. George Tucker.21 In sum and 
bstance, the collectivist interpretation of the phrase “others retained by the 
ople” is anachronistic—a projection of contemporary majoritarianism onto a 
t that is and was most naturally read as referring to the natural rights retained 
 all individuals, and to these rights alone. 
I. THE ANTIMAJORITARIANISM OF TH
arianism of James Madison 
Reading a right of state majoritarian rule into t
rticularly odd given that this provision was conceiv
ledge, by one of the more antimajoritarian figures of the day: James 
dison.22 Indeed, in a variety of fora, Madison consistently expressed his 
ew that popular majorities, especially those at the state level, were the 
incipal threat to “private” or individual rights. As Madison wrote in a letter to 
omas Jefferson in the period between the drafting of the Constitution and the 
ll of Rights: 
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of 
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the 
community, and th
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from 
s in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of 
 Constituents.23 
16
17
18. See infra Part I.C. 
19. See infra Part I.D. 
20.
21.
22. 7-10 (describing Madison’s undisputed role as the 
originato t). 
23. son to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 LETTERS 
. See infra Part I.A. 
. See infra Part I.B. 
See infra Part II. 
See infra Part III. 
See Barnett, supra note 15, at 
r of the Ninth Amendmen
Letter from James Madi
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cern for the violation of private individual rights by majorities was 
d in Madison’s theory of faction. “By a faction,” he famously wrote in 
deralist No. 10, “I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
jority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
mmon impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
izens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”24 
Madison had previously made a similar point to the Constitutional 
tion itself in words that foretold the argument of Federalist No. 10. “In 
 cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the 
hts of the minority are in danger.”25 He then applies this insight to state 
vernments: 
We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened 
period of time, 
n over man. What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of 
ong ourselves? Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major 
ber? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne 
d on the mercantile interest. The holders of one species of property have 
wn a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson 
 are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by a 
mon sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party 
ome insecure.26 
eed, Madison called for a constitutional convention to revise the 
s of Confederation, in
 that resulted from majoritarian rule in the states: 
If the multiplicity and mutability of laws prove a want of wisdom, their 
injustice betrays a defect still more alarming: more alarming not merely 
because it is a greater evil in itself, but because it brings more in
 fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who 
e in such Governments, are the safest Guardians both of public Good and of 
ate rights.28 
n’s explanation of why popular majorities are not to be trusted with the 
f the minority is worth considering in full: 
ce three individual
the voice of the others, and give to two of them an interest opposed to the 
AND OT
(Phila., 
24.
(emphases added). 
(A
(em
Pro l Amend ents, June 8, 1789, in WRI INGS 437 9 (Jack N
Rakove 
HER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 425 
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867) (first and second emphases added).  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
25. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 76 
drienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (1840) (statement of James Madison) 
phases added).  
26. Id. at 77 (emphases added); see also James Madison, Speech in Congress 
posing Constitutiona m T , 448-4 . 
ed., 1999).  
27. Madison, supra note 26. 
28. Id.  
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Madison’s antimajoritarianism is so patent and undeniable that, to advance 
hi o dismiss 
hi  in his 
 
s of the third? Will the latter be secure? The prudence of every man 
uld shun the danger. The rules & forms of justice suppose & guard against 
Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely to encroach on the rights 
one thousand? The contrary is witnessed by the notorious factions & 
ressions which take place in corporate towns limited as the opportunities 
, and in little republics when uncontrouled by apprehensions of external 
ger. If an enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of 
ate rights, it is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is 
s predominant in this case with the majority; but because a common interest 
passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combinations less easy to be 
med by a great than by a small number. The Society becomes broken into a 
ater variety of interests, of pursuits, of passions, which check each other, 
ilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of 
munication and concert. It may be inferred that the inconveniences of 
ular States contrary to the prevailing Theory, are in proportion not to the 
ent, but to the narrowness of their limits.29 
dison also made his skepticism of majoritarianism plain to the Virginia 
tion convention. There he observed that “on
, we shall find that turbulence, violence, and abuse of power, by the 
ajority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and 
mmotions, which, in republics, have, more frequently than any other cause, 
oduced despotism.”30 
From his private letters, to his call for altering the Articles of 
nfederation, to his speeches at the Constitutional Convention and the 
ginia ratification convention, to The Federalist Papers, Madison 
nsistently and clearly differentiates between, on the one hand, the power of 
 majority and, on the other, the private rights of individuals, as well as the 
gregate interests of the people as a whole. Yet Lash’s majoritarianism 
quires him to think that James Madison chose wording for a constitutional 
endment the public meaning of which protected a right of a majority in the 
tes to govern over the minority. That’s a problem. 
The Antimajoritarianism of the Constitutional Convention 
s collective rights reading of the Bill of Rights, Akhil Amar needs t
m as “a man ahead of his time.”31 But Madison was far from alone
29. Id.  
30. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
OPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 87 (1 ment of James Madison on June AD 876) (state
16, 1788).  
31. R, supra note 3, at 159-60 (“Madison . . . was a man ahead of his time.”); 
id. at 29 Madison did beli  individual r ts; in many wa , however, 
he was 
un
stat ts beyond those already contained in Article I, section 10, Amar is entirely 
See AMA
1 (“James eve in strong igh ys
ahead of his time . . . .”). Of course, insofar as he is referring to Madison’s 
successful efforts to extend additional federal protections of abuses of individual rights by 
e governmen
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m of majoritarianism. Opposition to majoritarianism, also derisively 
lled “democracy” in this period, in the form of legislative supremacy was 
eatedly voiced at the Constitutional Convention. As Elbridge Gerry, deputy 
m Massachusetts stated: “The evils we experience flow from the excess of 
mocracy.”32 After listing a number of abuses, he admitted that he “was still 
wever republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the 
illing spirit.”33 “Experience,” he claimed, “had shewn [sic] that the State 
islatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their 
nfidence.”34 
Roger Sherman, of Connecticut—who later came to serve on the 
ressional committee that drafted the Bill of Rights—contended that the 
 “immediately should have as little to do as may be about the 
vernment.”35 Virginian and future Attorney General Edmond Randolph 
served that “the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under 
ich the U.S. laboured.”36 And “that in tracing these evils to their origin 
ery man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy.”37 
uverneur Morris, deputy from Pennsylvania, noted that “[e]very man of 
servation had seen in the democratic branches of the State Legislatures, 
ecipitation—in Congress changeableness, in every department excesses 
ainst personal liberty private property & personal safety.”38 The only tepid 
fense of majoritarianism at the Convention came from Virginia’s George 
ason who “admitted that we had been too democratic” in forming state 
vernments but said he “was afraid we should incautiously run into the 
posite extreme.”39 
In place of the legislative supremacy incorporated in state constitutions that 
 to majoritarian factionalism, the Founders struggled to devise what they still 
lled a “republican” fo mr  of government in which the people would not rule, 
uld check by various mechanisms their agents in government who do. 
ey designed a constitutional structure based on “the policy of refining the 
co
ind
which Mad
32. MADISON, supra note 25, at 39 (statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
by state 
36 ement of Edmund Randolph). 
37
38
Re his support for democracy: 
“Notwit mong us from democracy; the 
genius o le is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted.” Id. at 
64. Rec e Constitution and opposed its 
ratification in 
rrect. But insofar as he implies that Madison was alone in his commitment to protecting 
ividual rights from abuses by the national government, and that the Ninth Amendment for 
ison was principally responsible should be read accordingly, Amar exaggerates. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 41. 
35. Id. at 39 (statement of Roger Sherman) (advocating that House members be chosen 
legislatures). 
. Id. at 42 (stat
. Id. 
. Id. at 233 (statement of Governeur Morris). 
39. Id. at 39 (statement of George Mason) (advocating popular elections of 
presentatives to the House). Later he amplified 
hstanding the oppressions & injustice experienced a
f the peop
all, however, that Mason eventually refused to sign th
the Virginia ratification convention. 
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ar appointments by successive filtrations” (though this filtration principle 
ould not be “pushed too far”).40 For this reason, Madison favored a 
pularly-elected House so that “the people would [not] be lost sight of 
together; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and 
ficers, [would not be] too little felt.”41 
Given that the popularly-elected House 
atic branch, the desire by Convention delegates to cabin democratic 
ajoritarianism was revealed most clearly during their discussion of the 
anner by which the President and, especially, the Senate were to be chosen. 
s Edmund Randolph summarized the problem: “The democratic 
entiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. 
e object of this 2d branch is to controul [sic] the democratic branch of the 
ational Legislature.”42 Gouverneur Morris agreed, observing that the object 
 the Senate was “to check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of” 
e House.43 “The use of the Senate,” said Madison, “is to consist in its 
oceeding with more coolness, with more system, & with more wisdom, than 
e popular branch.”44 
Lash would have us believe that, immediately after this counter-
ajoritarian Constitution w
propose adding language to the Constitution the public meaning of 
ich protected a constitutional right of majorities to rule in the states, the very 
t of right they denied majorities at the national level. Not very likely. 
The Antimajoritarianism of the Bill of Rights 
joritarian than were the framers and the Federalists.
eralist opponents, though more importantly it was meant to assuage 
se in the middle who were moved by the Antifederalists’ objection that the 
nstitution lacked a bill of rights and who were persuaded to support the 
nstitution after the Federalists promised to adopt a bill of rights. 
But the original proposed amendments were drafted by antimajoritarian 
mes Madison and approved by an antimajoritarian Federalist-dominated 
ngress. So it is not at all surprising that the Bill of Rights took on a 
idedly individualist cast. Providing express protections of individual rights 
d deliver on the Federalists’ promise while avoiding, to the degree 
40. Id. at 40 (statement of James Madison).  
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 110 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (advocating seven year terms for 
Senators). 
43.  at 233 (s
44.
Id. tatement of Governeur Morris). 
Id. at 83 (statement of James Madison). 
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ible, undermining their fledgling counter-majoritarian national government 
 the more majoritarian states. 
However, as the Federalists had p
ution of some individual rights would be dangerous to other individual 
hts not enumerated. Why? As Madison explained to Congress in his Bill of 
ghts speech, enumerating certain rights could later be taken as implying “that 
se rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the 
nds of the general government, and were consequently insecure.”45 Now that 
me individual rights were being protected, some solution to this danger was 
eded. 
Although Madison consulted the numerous amendments proposed by state 
ification conventions, none of these proposals addressed this specific 
eralist concern. All the similarly worded recommendations by the states 
ncerned construing the powers defined in the unamended Constitution; they 
 not address the problem of construing the rights retained by the people in 
ht of the enumeration of some of these rights that the state ratification 
nventions were proposing.46 
As Madison explained to Congress, the Ninth Amendment was his solution 
 the Federalist objection to adding a
is is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the 
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that may be 
guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentleman may see by turning to the 
t clause of the 4th resolution [the precursor of the Ninth Amendment].47 
akes the Ninth Amendment sui generis in the Bill of Rights insofar as it 
ecifically designed by James Madison to respond, not to Antifederalist 
s about the absence of a bill of rights, but to Federalist concerns about ern
luding one. For this reason, reading the Ninth Amendment in light of 
tifederalist concerns or state proposals protecting states rights is a serious 
or. 
Therefore, when it came to drafting a bill of rights, choosing language 
otecting individual private rights would satisfy the public’s concerns about 
ich the Preamble referred, without threatening the new national 
vernment’s power to reign in abusive state governments. Of course, the fact 
t a protection of individual rights would guard not only the rights of a 
nority against abuses by majority factions but also the rights of the majority 
ainst abuses by minority factions is a feature rather than a bug of protecting 
ividual rights. 
45. Madison, supra note 26, at 448-4
46. See Barnett, supr
9. 
a note 15, at 40-46 (discussing amendments proposed by state 
ratification conventions). 
47. See Madison, supra note 26, at 449. 
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n the purposes of Madison and the other Federalists in Congress, we 
expect the public meaning of the language of the Bill of Rights to be 
ividualist, and it is. Insofar as it protects the rights of the people, “the 
ople” is used as a mass noun to refer to the plural of persons who constitute 
 body politic (as distinct from other persons who are not a part of this 
ity). It explicitly distinguishes between “the people” and “the states” and, 
ere it protects the rights of states in a federal system, it does not use the 
ms “the people” or “right” at all; it uses the terms “power” and “states.” 
The meaning of “the people” in the Ninth Amendment is illuminated by 
parison with the use of that phrase elsewhere in the Bill of Rights and the 
iginal Constitution. Let us start with the language of the Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
irmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
sons or things to be seized.48 
ere is no question that the rights of “the people” to which the Fourth 
ment refers, though possessed b
ual. Individuals own their own bodies (“their persons”), and their own 
ouses, papers and effects.” The individual rights or mass noun reading of 
he people” in the Fourth Amendment is reinforced by the wholly individualist 
nguage of the Third Amendment that precedes it and is connected to it by its 
verage of the people’s houses: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
artered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, 
t in a manner to be prescribed by law.”49 
The drafting choice between the Third and Fourth Amendments is 
vealing. The Third Amendment could not have been written in the plural 
cause requiring the consent of “the people” b
 might have implied that the right was limited to houses owned by more 
n one person. But there is no such potential confusion when referring to the 
ividual rights that all “the people” share in common, such as their right to be 
cure in their persons. So there is no comparable barrier to drafting this 
ovision in the plural. In other words, all the persons comprising “the people” 
n possess individual rights in common. Saying that the individual rights 
ssessed by persons comprising a polity belong to “the people” in no way 
plies the existence of a different kind of collective or majoritarian rights or 
wers possessed by the people acting as a polity. 
Connected to the Fourth Amendment by its reference to “house,” the Third 
endment clearly protects the individual right of “the owner.” Similarly, the 
fth and Sixth Amendment are all worded in the singular: 
[Amendment V:] No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphases added). 
49. U.S. CONST. amend. III (emphases added). 
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rime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
ases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
vice in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
e offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
rived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.50 
endment VI:] In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy th  m
t to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
erein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
 accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
sistance of Counsel for his defense.51 
 with the Third, there was good reason here to switch to the singular 
rom the plural to focus on the particula
hen singled out for prosecution. And, though it refers neither to “the 
ople” nor to persons, the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil 
ses cannot possibly be conceived as a collective or majoritarian right.52 For 
at matter, neither can the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions on cruel and 
usual punishments and excessive fines.53 All these rights are, and can only 
, individual in their nature. 
When the Bill of Rights uses the term “the people,” it consistently refers to 
dividuals and not political collectives or electoral majorities, and all the 
umerated rights it protects belong to individuals and not collectives or 
jorities. So proponents of a collective rights or majoritarian reading of “the 
ople” in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments must claim that its meaning shifts 
these provisions. Although this claim is sometimes also made about “the 
ht of the people to keep and bear Arms” in the Second Amendment,54 the 
idence that this language referenced an individual right is so overwhelming 
at, in recent years, the argument against protecting an individual right to bear 
ms has shifted. Most who reject the applicability of the Second Amendment 
modern gun laws now claim that the reference in its preface to “[a] well-
ulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,”55 impliedly 
alifies what would be the natural individual rights reading of what follows. 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphases added). 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphases added). 
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact trie ourt of the United States, than 
accordin ). 
53. l not be required, nor excessive 
fines im
d by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any C
g to the rules of the common law.” (emphasis added)
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shal
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
55. Id. 
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eed, they now claim that the Second Amendment does indeed protect an 
ividual right, albeit an individual right that applies only in the context of 
litia service, however awkward and incongruous this interpretation may be.56 
Apart from the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the original meaning of 
we are ascertaining, this leaves just the First Amendment’s reference to 
he right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
r a redress of grievances”57 as possible collective or group rights. Although 
hil Amar has claimed these rights to be collective,58 the mere fact that it 
es more than one person to “assemble” does not make it a collective right of 
 people as a whole, and certainly it does not even imply it is a right 
ssessed by a majority of the people qua majority. Individuals could and did 
tition the government for redress of grievances. 
We are rightly accustomed to conceiving of the rights of free exercise of 
igion, freedom of speech and freedom of the press as all belonging to 
uals, though of course each can sometimes be exercised in and by 
oups of individuals. Madison’s initial proposal made this clearer: “The people 
all not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish 
ir sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of 
erty, shall be inviolable.”59 Does a collective body of the people have, write, 
d publish “their sentiments”? Does a majority? Notwithstanding Madison’s 
e of the mass noun “the people” in his proposal, these are all individual 
hts. 
There is a single possible exception to the exclusively individual rights 
aracter of the first eight amendments: “Congress shall make no law 
pecting an establishment of religion.”  The Establishment Clause denies to 
ress the power of establishing religion and at the same time also seems to 
56. See, e.g., H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE 
RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002) (arguing that the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment protected an individual right solely in the 
context of service in an organized militia). But cf. Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep 
and Bea
(20
sim
ex
conven abolish our government.”); see also 
id. at xi
it, 
co
by
ma
a “
r Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237 
04) (contesting Uviller & Merkel’s thesis). 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
58. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 3, at 26 (“The right of the people to assemble does not 
ply protect the ability of self-selected clusters of individuals to meet together; it is also an 
press reservation of the collective right of We the People to assemble in a future 
t  right to alter or ion and exercise our sovereign
he Bi (“The genius of t ill was not to downplay organizational structure but to deploy 
not to impede popular majorities but to empower them.”). Amar is simply too 
nceptually fuzzy in his references to “collective rights” be sure of what exactly he means 
 these terms. Of course, the fact that purely individual rights protect the rights of the 
jority and minorities alike, as they do, does not establish the proposition that they protect 
collective right” of a majority qua majority as Lash sometimes seems to claim. 
59. Madison, supra note 26, at 442 (emphases added). 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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tect the rights of states,  and the majorities therein, to maintain their 
tablishments of religions. Given the collective rights thesis of Akhil Amar 
d Kurt Lash, it is striking that the only state-protective provision in the Bill 
 Rights refers neither to the rights of the people nor to the rights of states, but 
written entirely as a limitation of federal power. There was an obvious way 
express this limitation on federal power as a collective right—“The right of 
 people/states to establish a religion shall not be infringed”—but for 
known reasons this formulation was avoided. So where the Federalist 
mers of the Bill of Rights were willing to protect a power of a state or 
jority therein, they avoided the language of rights altogether.62 
It is telling that no unambiguously collective use of “the people” is 
luded anywhere in the original Constitution. There were originally just two 
rences in the Constitution to “the people.” The Preamble famously declares 
at 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
estab
ence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
selves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
ited States of America.63 
the People” to which the Preamble refers is a collective entity, would it 
tead have read “secure the B
ich corresponds to the royal “we” rather than the plural “ourselves”? Akhil 
ar’s collective reading of “We the People” notwithstanding, “ourselves” 
plies that “the people” of the Preamble is an aggregate of individuals who 
mprise a particular polity. 
Apart from the Preamble, the only other reference to “the people” in the 
iginal Constitution is in Article I, Section 2: “The House of Representatives 
all be composed of Members ch
 States . . . .”64 There is nothing inconsistent between this usage and an 
ividualist meaning of “the people” as a group of individuals who constitute 
61. Although it does contain the expressed limitation on federal power, the original 
rding of Madison’s proposal lacked this state protective implication: “The civil rights of wo
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national 
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or 
on any p
(st
est
no
am
an
the
compen n
ele
retext, infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (June 8, 1789). (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) 
atement of James Madison). Indeed, the change of wording is part of what justifies a state 
ablishment protective meaning of the Establishment Clause. 
62. Of course, in the original proposed amendments, the Establishment Clause would 
t have been the only amendment that did not protect an individual right. The first two 
endments proposed by Congress concerned the allocation of representatives by population 
d restrictions on the power of Congress to enact pay increases, the last of which became 
 Twenty-Seventh Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law, varying the 
satio  for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an 
ction of Representatives shall have intervened.”). 
63. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). 
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ody politic. And this reference to “the people” is expressly contrasted with 
t of “the legislature” that selected senators.65 As used here, “the people” and 
e legislature” are distinct concepts and terms. Popular sovereignty, such as it 
s thought to be, is certainly not here equated with legislative supremacy. 
oreover, as we shall see momentarily, it is potentially significant that Article 
efers to “the people of the several states,” in sharp contrast with the Ninth 
d Tenth Amendments, where this language was omitted over the objections 
 Antifederalist Senators. 
Language matters. That the language chosen for the Bill of Rights by
nd the other Federalists in Congress had a decidedly individualist 
c meaning is shown by the reception of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
the Virginia legislature when it deliberated over whether to ratify these and 
 other amendments proposed by Congress. To appreciate the significance of 
s debate, one must first examine two amendments that had been proposed to 
ngress by the Virginia ratification convention when it ratified the 
nstitution: 
 First, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, 
jurisdiction and righ
Congress of the United States or to the departments of the Foederal [sic] 
vernment. . . . 
Seventeenth, That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not 
rcise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend 
 powers of Congre
ep ions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise as 
erted merely for greater caution.66 
ere is nothing in these proposals about the rights of the people, collective 
rwise. They speak entirely in the language of the retained powers, 
tions and rights of states, which is th
 a right of state governance. Nor is there anything in Virginia’s 
oposals that deals with the problem for which the Ninth Amendment was 
adison’s solution: how to avoid the danger to unenumerated rights when 
me subset of rights are expressly singled out for protection in a bill of rights. 
stead of dealing with the dangers of enumerating rights, these proposals 
lely concern the problems of limiting federal power and protecting the rights 
 states. With respect to these issues, the Virginians said exactly what they 
ant. 
65. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
o Senators
66. Amend
tw  from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . .”). 
ments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 675 (Neil H. 
Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
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 because the Federalists in Congress proposed amendments with 
t wording and having a different public meaning, Virginia’s General 
sembly initially rejected the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (then the 
venth and twelfth proposed “articles of amendments” respectively).67 In the 
rginia senate, to which the amendments were then referred, a majority 
moaned the Ninth Amendment because it so greatly deviated from their 
te’s proposals for amendments, or from the proposals of any other state, as to 
 unrecognizable: 
We do not find that the
we therefore conceive that the people of Virginia should be consulted with 
pect to it, even if we did not doubt the propriety of adopting it; but it 
ears to us to be highly exceptionable.68 
at the public meaning of the Ninth Amendment completely differed 
e language previously proposed by Vir in
on: “If it is meant to guard against the extension of the powers of 
ngress by implication, it is greatly defective, and does by no means 
mprehend the idea expressed in the 17th article of amendments proposed by 
irginia . . . .”69 
The Virginians read the Ninth Amendment as attempting to protect 
dividual or personal 
tive and dangerous manner: 
[A]s it respects personal rights, [it] might be dangerous, because, should the 
rights of the people be invaded or called into question, they might be required 
to shew by the constitution what rights th
 from that instrument be proved to be retained by them, they might be 
ied to possess. Of this there is ground to be apprehensive, when Congress 
already seen denying certain rights of the people, heretofore deemed clear 
d unquestionable.70 
ven that they found no protection of states’ rights in the wording of the 
Amendment, the Virginians then read “the rights of the people” as 
g solely to “personal rights
ed them.71 Sadly, their judgment of the effectiveness of the Ninth 
67. See Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 
CUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786-
70, at 219 (1905) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION]. The 
DO
18
legislative history of the eventual ratification of the amendments by Virginia is convoluted 
and not 
the
Ja
CO
am
OF 
n Virginia is im ant evidence at its 
worth detailing here, except to note that the Virginia senate not only initially rejected 
 Ninth and Tenth Amendments, but the First and Sixth Amendments as well. See Letter of 
mes Madison to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1790), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
NSTITUTION, supra, at 231 (reporting the rejection of the third and eighth proposed 
endments). 
68. Saturday, December 12, 1789, in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
VIRGINIA 63 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1828). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 63-64 (first and second emphases added). 
71. The reaction to the Ninth Amendment i port th
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endment proved to be prescient. This last quotation succinctly summarizes 
w the Ninth Amendment has largely failed to achieve its purpose. 
Equally inhospitable to a collective rights reading of “the people” in th
mendment was the Virginia majority’s objection to the wording of the 
nth Amendment (then the twelfth proposed article of amendment). This they 
ected because the words “or to the people” had been added to their proposal 
reby changing its meaning to undercut rather than protect states rights: 
We conceive that the 12th article would come up to the 1st article of the 
Virginia amendments, were it not for the words “or to the people.” It is not 
lared to be the people of the respective States; but the expression applies to 
 people generally as citizens of the United States, and leaves it doubtful 
at powers are reserved to the State Legislatures. Unrestrained by the 
stitution or these amendments, Congress might, as the supreme rule of the 
ple, assume those powers which properly belong to the respective States, 
 thus gradually effect an entire consolidation.72 
jection echoed that of Virginia’s U.S. Senator, Richard Henry Lee: 
 comparing the Senate amendments with [those] from belo
attending to the m[atter] the former will appear well calculated to enfeeble 
d] produce ambiguity—for instance—Rights res[erved] to the States or the 
ople—The people here is evidently designed fo[r the] People of the United 
tes, not of the Individual States [page torn] the former is the Constitutional 
a of the people—We the People &c. . . . [T]his mode of expressing was 
dently calculated to give the Residuum to the people of the U. States, 
ich was the Constitutional language, and to deny it to the people of the 
iv. State—At least that it left room for cavil & false construction—They 
uld not insert after people therof—altho it was moved.73 
original 
propose l importance of 
Virginia’s proposal and its deliberations over the Ninth Amendment, in his Stanford essay 
La
Ku
(20
La
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La
Nin
sup
Go
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(H
Al the people” was indeed added by the Senate to the wording proposed by the 
House f h t 
meaning differed completely from the state-protective amendment Virginia had 
d to Congress. It seems that rather than tout, as he once did, the centra
sh now emphasizes the differently worded amendment proposed by New York. Compare 
rt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 333 
04) (dramatically highlighting the Virginia debates in the opening two paragraphs), with 
sh, supra note 4, at 909-10, 915-16 (discussing the proposal of the New York ratification 
nvention and omitting any mention of Virginia’s proposals). As I noted in my critique of 
sh’s earlier efforts, New York’s proposal bears a somewhat closer resemblance to the 
th Amendment in that, unlike Virginia’s, it at least mentions “the people.” See Barnett, 
ra note 15, at 44 (“New York’s proposal distinguishes between ‘the People’ and ‘State 
vernments’ and reserves rights to the people, as opposed to Virginia’s which refers only 
reserving rights to the states.”). Nevertheless, like Virginia’s proposal, New York’s 
posed amendments had nothing whatsoever to do with the problem to which the Ninth 
endment is addressed: the danger of adding a bill of rights. And the Virginians, at least, 
 not see the Ninth Amendment as resembling the proposals of any other state, including 
w York. 
72. Saturday, December 12, 1789, supra note 68, at 64 (emphasis added).  
73. Letter of Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING THE 
L OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 295, 296 
elen E. Veit, et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (ellipsis added).  
though “or to 
or w at became the Tenth Amendment, my perusal of the Senate Journal does no
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d both of Virginia’s United States Senators accompanied their joint 
to the Governor of Virginia with their affirmation that the amendments 
oposed by Congress did not comport with those recommended by Virginia. 
[I]t is with grief that we now send forward propositions inadequate to the 
pose of real and substantial Amendments, and so far short of the wishes of 
 Country. By perusing the Journal of the Senate, your Excellency will see, 
t we did, in vain, bring to view the Amendments proposed by our 
nvention, and approved by the Legislature.74 
 far as Lee and the majority in the Virginia sen
meaning of “the people” in the Tenth Amendment was not a reference to 
e majoritarian or collective right of the people in the states to govern free of 
terference of the federal government. To the contrary, they read it as 
otecting the powers reserved to the people “as citizens of the United States.” 
e very language they desired to protect states rights was, however, 
entually incorporated into another constitution. 
The Constitution of the Confederate States of America contained two 
ovisions that corresponded to the Ninth and Tenth A
ant additional language (in italics): 
5. The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained b
States. 
he powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor 
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the 
ple there
e original public meaning of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments been as 
vist and/or majoritarian as Lash claims, there would have been no need 
 their wording i  tn his way to achieve a state-protective result, especially 
Lash is correct about how subsequent courts interpreted the Ninth 
rev
74. Letter of Richard Henry Lee & William Grayson to the Governor of Virginia 
(Sept. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 216. 
Their private criticisms of the proposed amendments in their correspondence with Patrick 
He illiam Grayson, “[T]hey are so 
mutilate
the
an
CR
ca
ret
on
su
mo
14
“th
Te
eal any motion to add “thereof” to this provision. 
nry were even more vociferous. In the words of Senator W
d & gutted that in fact they are good for nothing, & I believe as many others do, that 
y will do more harm than benefit: The Virginia amendments were all brought into view, 
d regularly rejected.” Letter of William Grayson to Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789), in 
EATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 300. And Senator Lee explained: “As they 
me from the H. of R. they were very short of the wishes of our Convention, but as they are 
urned by the Senate they are certainly much weakened. You may be assured that nothing 
 my part was left undone to prevent this, and every possible effort was used to give 
ccess to all the Amendments proposed by our Country—We might as well have tried to 
ve Mount Atlas upon our shoulders.” Letter of Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 
, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 295. 
75. CONFEDERATE CONST. art. VI, §§ 5, 6 (1861) (emphases added). The addition of 
ereof” to the Tenth Amendment is reminiscent of Richard Henry Lee’s objection to the 
nth Amendment discussed in text accompanying supra note 74. 
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endment in the early Nineteenth Century.  The Confederate constitution 
ches what language might have expressly protected collectivist or states 
hts, and it was not the language used in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 
n individualist reading of the rights and powers of the people 
ed by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments respectively be reconciled with 
 concept of popular sovereignty that was held at the Founding? Is not the 
ry notion of popular sovereignty an inherently collectivist or majoritarian 
e?77 I think not. While I am not prepared to claim that no one in the 
unding period held a collectivist conception of popular sovereignty, there is 
od reason to doubt that the Constitution incorporated such a view. As Exhibit 
for this claim, I offer the first great constitutional decision of the Supreme 
urt in which a majority of the Court assumed a highly individualist 
nception of popular sovereignty. 
In 1792, Alexander Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina and executor of 
 estate of Robert Farquhar, brought s
f Georgia in the Supreme Court of the United States. Chisholm alleged 
t Georgia had failed to pay Farquhar for goods that Farquhar had supplied 
orgia during the Revolutionary War. Attorney General Edmund Randolph 
peared to argue the case for the plaintiff before the Court. Georgia refused to 
pear, claiming that as a “sovereign” state, it could not be sued without its 
nsent. 
In Chisholm v. Georgia,78 by a vote of four to one, the Supreme Court 
ected Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity and affirmed the individual 
ntract righ
tion of popular sovereignty in existence when the Constitution was 
opted some three years before. All Justices delivered separate opinions 
riatim. In rejecting Georgia’s claim, only Justice Blair relied solely on the 
xt of the Constitution. The other three relied also on “the principles of general 
risprudence.”79 
To evaluate Georgia’s claimed immunity, the Justices were compelled to 
amine the concept of sovereignty and its relationship with the individual 
ht being asserted by Chisholm. As Justice Cushing observed:  
e rights of individuals and the justice due to them, are as dear and precious 
76. See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 T
. 597
EX. L. 
REV
77.
is based on the concept of popular sovereignty, both the text and historical record suggest 
that the peop
federal g
 (1793). 
79
, 609 (2005). 
See, e.g., Lash, supra note 4, at 935 (“To the extent that one’s constitutional theory 
le insisted on preserving areas of community life beyond the reach of the 
overnment.”). 
78. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
. Id. at 453 (Wilson, J.). 
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 and object of them must be to secure and support the rights of individuals, 
else vain is Government.80  
ief Justice John Jay—former p
 ambassador to Spain and France, and one of the original co-authors of 
e Federalist Papers—expounded on the nature of sovereignty: 
[T]he sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation, and the residuary 
sovereignty of each State in the people of each State . . . .  
 [A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are 
truly e sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects  th
(unless the African slaves among us may be so called) and have none to 
govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, 
and as joint tenants in the sovereignty. . . . 
 Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State-sovereign is the person 
or e sovereignty is generally persons in whom that resides. In Europe th
ascribed to the Prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign 
actually administers the Government; here, never in a single instance; our 
Governors are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same relation 
to their sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns.81 
In othe
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r words, here the people themselves do not rule. Rather, their agents in 
ment rule on their behalf and subject to their ultimate control. But the 
ople nevertheless remain sovereign, not the government. 
Jay denied that when individuals band together to form a government, 
ether a state or municipality, they acquire some sort of collective rights they 
 not possess singly as individuals. Indeed, Jay maintained that, as with 
izens constituting a municipality, a claim of immunity by individual citizens 
nstituting a state would violate popular sovereignty. 
In this land of equal liberty, shall forty odd thousand in one place be 
compellable to do justice, and yet fifty odd thousand in another place be 
privileged to do justice only as they may think proper? Such obj
correspond with the equal rights we claim; with the equality we profess to 
ire and maintain, and with that popular sovereignty in which every citizen 
takes.82 
 too would it violate equal justice for the aggregate of the sovereign 
uals comprising a state to be able to bring suit against a single individual 
enying the i
g suit against the majority.83  
Chief Justice Jay expressly rejected any privileged majoritarian rights as 
consistent with his individualist conception of popular sovereignty: 
The exception contended for, would contradict and do violence to the great 
and leading principles of a free and e uaq l national government, one of the 
80. Id. at 468 (Cushing, J.). 
Id. at 471-72 (Jay, C.J.). 
Id. at 472-73 (emphasis added). 
81.
82.
83. Id. at 477. 
Comment [REB1]: I 
repositioned the ellipses to look 
better.  Let me know if there is some 
reason why this is not all right. 
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objects of which is, to ensure justice to all: To the few against the many, 
well as to the many against the few. It would be strange, indeed, that the 
nt and equal sovereigns of this country, should, in the very Constitution by 
ich they professed to establish justice, so far deviate from the plain path of 
ality and impartiality, as to give to the collective citizens of one State, a 
t of suing individual citizens of another State, and yet deny to those 
zens a right of suing them.84 
r Jay, claims of right do not turn 
ustice is the same whether due from one man or a million, o
one man; because it teaches and greatly appreciates the value of our free 
ublican national Government, which places all our citizens on an equal 
ting, and enables each and every of them to obtain justice without any 
ger of being overborne by the weight and number of their opponents; and, 
ause it brings into action, and enforces this great and glorious principle, 
t the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that fellow 
izens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each other 
their own Courts to have their controversies determined.85 
stice Wilson’s lengthy analysis of popular sovereignty was, if anything, 
ore individualist than Chief Justice Jay’s. Wilson began by
y term “sovereignty.” 
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally 
unknown. There is but one place w
But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the 
icacy of those, who ordained and established that Constitution. They might 
e announced themselves “SOVEREIGN” people of the United States: But 
enely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.86 
en it came to word choices, Wilson should have known. As a delegate 
Constitutional Convention from Pennsylvania, Wilson, along with 
d Randolph (but not James Madison), was a member of the Committe  
ail that produced the first draft of the Constitution. Perhaps our most 
glected Founder, Wilson spoke more often at the Convention than anyone but 
ouverneur Morris and his remarks dominate the report of the Pennsylvania 
tification convention. He was also the first professor of law at the University 
 Pennsylvania.87  
84. Id. at 477 (em hap ses added). This passage seriously undermines Akhil Amar’s 
dismissal of Madison’s concern with minority rights as being ahead of its time. See AMAR, 
supra note 3. Clearly, Madison’s concern was shared by Chief Justice Jay. 
85. Id. at 479 (emphases added). 
86.
DE
(d ; Julian 
P. Boyd ERICAN BIOGRAPHY 326, 329 (Dumas Malone 
ed., 19 ( tributions to and influence at the Pennsylvania 
ratificat o
Id. at 454 (Wilson, J.). 
87. See James Wilson (1742-1798), in JOSEPH C. MORTON, SHAPERS OF THE GREAT 
BATE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 301, 304-07, 307 n.1 (2006) 
escribing Wilson’s contributions to and influence at the Constitutional Convention)
, James Wilson, in DICTIONARY OF AM
36) describing Wilson’s con
ion c nvention). 
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his lengthy opinion in olm, Justice Wilson considered three 
tions of sovereignty that were inappropriate when applied to the 
nstitution. First, he repudiated the conception of sovereign as opposed to 
ubject” as wholly inapplicable in the United States. The Constitution, he 
ted, speaks only of “citizens” and “persons.”88 As Wilson observed, “[t]he 
m, subject, occurs, indeed, once in the instrument; but to mark the contrast 
ongly, the epithet ‘foreign’ is prefixed.”89 Second, he rejected the notion of 
vereign as one that governs independent of any other power. Given that a 
ublican government is subject to the control of the people, Wilson denied 
t the people of Georgia ceded sovereignty in this sense to their state.90 
Finally, Wilson vehemently rejected the feudal conception of sovereignty 
opted in England and advocated by William Blackstone: 
Into England this system was introduced by the conqueror: and to this era we 
may, probably, refer the English maxim, that the King or sovereig
ntain of Justice. But, in the case of the King, the sovereignty had a double 
ration. While it vested him with jurisdiction over others, it excluded all 
ers from jurisdiction over him. With regard to him, there was no superior 
er; and, consequently, on feudal principles, no right of jurisdiction.91 
lson characterized this as “only a branch of a much more extensive 
le, on which a plan of systematic despotism has been lately formed in 
d, and prosecuted with unwearied assiduity and care. Of this plan the 
thor of the Commentaries was, if not the introducer, at least the great 
pporter.”92 Wilson read Blackstone as contending that “sovereignty is 
ssessed by the Parliament: In the Parliament, therefore, the supreme and 
solute authority is vested: In the Parliament resides that uncontrollable and 
spotic power, which, in all Governments, must reside somewhere.”93 If 
t]he Parliament form the great body politic of England,” Wilson asked, 
w]hat, then, or where, are the People? Nothing! No where! . . . From legal 
88. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 456 (Wilson, J.) (“In one sense, the term sovereign has for 
elative, subject, In [sic] this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no its corr
object in the Constitution of the United States. Under that Constitution there are citizens, but 
no subjects. ‘Citizen of the United States.’ ‘Citizens of another State.’ ‘Citizens of different 
States.’ 
Su
Sta
this prin
Co
act
surr
reta
sov
‘A State or citizen thereof.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
89. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (referring to “foreign States, Citizens or 
bjects”). 
90. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 457 (Wilson, J.) (“As a citizen, I know the Government of that 
te to be republican; and my short definition of such a Government is, one constructed on 
ciple, that the Supreme Power resides in the body of the people. As a Judge of this 
urt, I know, and can decide upon the knowledge, that the citizens of Georgia, when they 
ed upon the large scale of the Union, as a part of the ‘People of the United States,’ did not 
ender the Supreme or Sovereign Power to that State; but, as to the purposes of the Union, 
ined it to themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a 
ereign State.”). 
91. Id. at 458. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 462 (footnote omitted). 
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plation they totally disappear! Am I not warranted in saying, that, if this 
a just description; a Government, so and justly so described, is a despotic 
vernment?”94 
The “despotic” p
 law must be prescribed by a superior.”95 To the contrary, for Wilson, 
nother principle, very different in its nature and operations, forms, in my 
dgment, the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the 
re source of equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, 
ose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must 
 found in the man.”96 
Wilson proceeded to characterize the individual free man as an original 
vereign and states as mere aggregations of individuals, a collection of 
ginal sovereigns: 
The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws, is, that he 
binds himself. Upon th
 laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which are formed and 
horised by those laws. If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all 
; why may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original 
ereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each singly is undiminished; the 
nity of all jointly must be unimpaired.97 
ally, Wilson ends his lengthy analysis by briefly turning to the text of 
 III. According to the express terms of the
ple of Georgia had consented to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
en the state of Georgia was sued by a citizen of another state.98 
In Chisholm, no Justice, including Justice Iredell in dissent,99 alludes to 
y right of a majority to govern. To the contrary, for Chief Justice Jay, 
vereignty resided in the individual, and the “collective citizens f oo ne 
00 or “the many”101 have no special power or right to violate the rights 
 even a single person. Such was the equality of rights. Indeed, “one of the 
eat objects” of the national government was “to ensure justice to all: To the 
 against the many, as well as to the many against the few.”102 For Justice 
ilson, a state was nothing more than “an aggregate of free men, a collection 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 458. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 456 (emphases added). 
98. t 464-66. 
99. sted his dissent mainly on the claim that the Court had not been 
granted d ese suits by Congress as was necessary, and only secondarily on 
his accep munity akin to that formerly possessed by the 
King of g is principle. See id. at 429-50 (Iredell, J., 
dissentin
100
See id. a
Justice Iredell re
n over thjuris ictio
tance of the principle of sovereign im
 En land, though he did accept th
g). 
. Id. at 477 (Jay, C.J.). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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inal sovereigns:”  sovereignty resides in the individual. For Justice 
shing, “The rights of individuals and the justice due to them, are as dear and 
ecious as those of States. Indeed the latter are founded upon the former 
 . .”104 Thus was Georgia, a state “so respectable, and whose claim soars so 
gh”105 held to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court when 
ed for violating the individual contract rights of single citizen. 
As we all know, the Court’s decision in Chisholm was effectively rev
 adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, since the post-
construction 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana,106 a majority of the Supreme 
urt has taken the view that the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment 
resents the repudiation of the principles enunciated by a majority of the 
urt in Chisholm, that Chisholm was wrongly decided, and that the Eleventh 
endment merely restored the status quo ante. In Seminole Tribe of Florida 
Florida,107 Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized this stance by quoting 
ns: 
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood the 
venth Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
supposition . . . which it confirms.” That presupposition, first observed 
r a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana (1890), has two parts: first, that each 
te is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that “[i]t is 
erent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an 
ividual without its consent.”108 
ewhere I have explained why it is wrong to claim that the Eleventh 
ment restored an original meaning that had been distorted by four 
tices of the Supreme Court in their first great constitutional case. Instead, the 
eventh Amendment revised or changed the original meaning of the 
nstitution because that meaning had led to an unpopular result.109 What I did 
t realize then is that Chief Justice John Marshall reaffirmed the original 
rrectness of Chisholm even after its holding was reversed by the Eleventh 
endment.  
In Fletcher v. Peck,110 Marshall made the following observation: 
103
104
105. Id. at 453 (Wilson, J.). 
106. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
107
108 .S. at 13) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).
109  or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and 
Popular 1-55 (2007). In addition, I add my voice to 
the chor  
accordin
all s. See id. at 1745-55. 
110
. Id. at 456 (Wilson, J.). 
. Id. at 468 (Cushing, J.). 
. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
. Id. at 54 (quoting Hans, 134 U
 
. See Randy E. Barnett, The People
 Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 174
us of scholars who maintain that the Eleventh Amendment should be interpreted 
g to its terms rather than according to the underlying “presupposition” for which it 
egedly stand
. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). 
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tution, as passed, gave the courts of the United States jurisdiction in 
ts brought against individual states. A state, then, which violated its own 
tract was suable in the courts of the United States for that violation. Would 
ave been a defence in such a suit to say that the state had passed a law 
olving itself from the contract? It is scarcely to be conceived that such a 
ence could be set up. And yet, if a state is neither restrained by the general 
ciples of our political institutions nor by the words of the constitution from 
airing the obligation of its own contracts, such a defence would be a valid 
. This feature is no longer found in the constitution, but it aids in the 
struction of those clauses with which it was originally associated.111 
 other words, according to Chief John Marshall and contrary to Chief Justice 
hnquist, some twenty years after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, 
isholm was still considered a faithful interpretation of the original meaning 
 the Constitution at the time it was decided and remained a correct reading of 
 general principles of our political institutions. 
As was mentioned in the Introduction, Lash offers a single source who 
 refers to collective rights: St. George Tucker’s statement that “the 
wers delegated to the federal government, are, in all cases, to receive the 
st strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the rights of a state 
 of the people, either collectively, or individually, may be drawn in 
estion.”112 Given that it is the only reference to “collective rights” among his 
unding-era sources, Lash uses it not once but twice.113 
Tucker’s views of the Ninth and Tenth Amendment respectively are indeed 
orth close consideration, which I have given them elsewhere.11
or of law at the College of William and Mary, one of the leading judges 
 the General Court in Virginia, and the American editor of Blackstone’s 
mmentaries, the most influential and authoritative legal work of the period. 
 the 1803 edition of the Commentaries, he attached an appendix entitled 
tes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of 
e United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in which he provides 
e first scholarly gloss on the meaning of the Constitution. Though published 
ter 1800, Tucker’s treatise was based on notes of his lectures given 
roughout the 1790’s and was contemporaneous with the earliest years of the 
nstitution.115 
111. Id. at 28 (emp
112. See Lash
hases added). 
, supra note 4, at 919 (quoting St. George Tucker, A View of the 
Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. 154 (St. George 
Tucker, ed., Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803)).  
113. e 
114
115
19
Se id. at 919, 936. 
. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 69-75. 
. THE VIRGINIA LAW REPORTERS BEFORE 1880, at 101-02 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed. 
77).  
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ker’s treatment of both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments is completely 
 with Lash’s collectivist reading of the Ninth. In the beginning of his 
tes, Tucker states that: “The state governments . . . retain every power, 
isdiction, and right not delegated to the United States, by the constitution, 
r prohibited by it to the states.”116 This states’ rights proposition is followed 
 a footnote citation to the Tenth Amendment, not the Ninth.117 Tucker then 
ys the construction “that in the new government, as in the old, the general 
wers are limited, and that the states, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the 
joyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdictions . . . has since been 
lly confirmed by the twelfth article of amendments . . . .”118 In other words, 
ere he is considering the powers and rights of states, Tucker consistently 
ferences the Tenth Amendment and not the Ninth. 
Later in his Notes, Tucker differentiates the Ninth Amendment from the 
nth in a section considering them both jointly. Accord
nd Tenth Amendments together justify a narrow construction of federal 
wers when the rights and powers of individuals are at issue; the Tenth 
mendment by itself justifies a narrow construction of federal powers when the 
hts and powers of the states are implicated. To distinguish these two rules of 
nstruction I have inserted the numbers in brackets. 
All the powers of the federal government being either expressly enumerated, 
or necessary and proper to the execution of some enumerate
being one of the rules of construction which sound reason has adopted; that, as 
eption strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration 
akens it, in cases not enumerated; it follows, as a regular consequence, that 
every power which concerns the right of the citizen, must be construed 
ctly, where it may operate to infringe or impair his liberty; and liberally, 
 for his benefit, where it may operate to his security and happiness, the 
wed object of the constitution: and, in like manner, [2] every power which 
 been carved out of the states, who, at the time of entering into the 
federacy, were in full possession of all the rights of sovereignty, is in like 
nner to be construed strictly, wherever a different construction might 
ogate from the rights and powers, which by the latter of these articles, are 
ressly acknowledged to be reserved to them respectively.119 
ven that the section in which this passage appears is discussing the Ninth 
enth Amendment together, both amendments support a rule of 
ction when the individual liberty or “right of the citizen” are 
the singular tense: his liberty, his benefit, his security and happiness. In 
116. Tucker, supra note 112, at app. 141. This proposition, which tracks Virginia’s 
th proposed amendment, originated in the Articles of Confederation. See ARTICLES OF 17
CONFEDERATION art. II (“Each state retains . . . every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is 
not . . . expressly delegated . . . .”). 
117.  In Tu
eleventh w
Id. cker’s Notes, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are still referred to as the 
 and t elfth articles of amendments respectively. 
118. Id. at 142-43 (emphasis added). 
119. Id. at 307-08 (emphases and numbers in brackets added). 
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trast, the Tenth Amendment (“the latter of these two articles”) is singled out 
 justifying a strict construction of federal powers when a broader construction 
ght derogate from the rights and powers of states. 
Tucker’s account is fundamentally incompatible with L
n the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. In the passage just quoted, Tucker 
arly advocates two rules of construction depending on whether the rights of 
ividuals or states are implicated by the exercise of federal power. The rule of 
nstruction protecting individual liberty is supported by the Ninth and Tenth 
endments; the rule of construction protecting the rights, powers and 
isdiction of states is supported by the Tenth Amendment alone. Lash’s 
count is different. According to him: 
The Tenth limits the government to enumerated ends, while the Ninth 
Amendment limits the scope of Congress’ impl
merated ends. In particular, the Ninth prohibits the federal government 
m claiming that the only limit to its “necessary and proper powers” are 
se expressly enumerated in the Constitution. The people have other rights 
t also constrain the scope of enumerated federal power.120 
 makes this move to show that the “other” rights to which the Ninth 
ment refers include the majoritarian rights of states along wi
uals. But while Lash claims that only the Ninth Amendment supports a 
rrowing rule of construction, his account is at odds with Tucker’s, which 
ntends that the Tenth Amendment also justifies a strict construction of 
deral power when the rights and powers of states are threatened: “As federal 
is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of a state 
ay be drawn in question . . . .”121 This sentence is followed by a footnote 
ting the Tenth Amendment, not the Ninth. 
Whereas Tucker viewed the Tenth Amendment standing alone as 
otecting states’ rights from a latitudinarian construction of federal powers, he 
wed the Ninth Amendment, and the reference to
ecting individual rights against latitudinarian constructions of federal 
120. Lash, supra note 4, at 922 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original). 
121. Tucker, supra note 112, at app. 151 (original emphasis on “state”; additional 
emphases added). In this regard, Tucker is following Madison’s objections to the 
constitutionality of the Aliens and Sedition Acts in his Report of 1800 in which Madison 
made th c
under th e
Ja WRITINGS, supra 
note 26, 
Amendm
protecte
ground late the reserved powers of states. 
He
e exa t same distinction between express powers and latitudinarian interpretations 
e Nec ssary and Proper Clause that is employed by Lash: 
[T]he first question is, whether the power be expressed in the constitution. If it be, the 
question is decided. If it be not expressed; the next enquiry must be, whether it is properly an 
incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, it may be exercised by 
Congress. If it be not; Congress cannot exercise it. 
mes Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, Jan. 7, 1800, in 
at 608, 642 (emphases added). Yet, in his Report, Madison nowhere cites the Ninth 
ent. There was no need as the individual right violated by the Sedition Act was 
d by the First Amendment. But Madison also opposed the Alien Friends Act on the 
that it employed a latitude of interpretation to vio
 bases this rule of construction protecting states rights on the Tenth Amendment. 
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er: “ s a social compact it ought likewise to receive the same strict 
nstruction, wherever the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or of 
ivate property may become the subject of dispute . . . .”122 This passage is 
llowed by a footnote reference to both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Not 
y is this a strong affirmation that the Ninth Amendment protects individual 
 “personal” rights, Tucker makes no mention whatsoever of a collective or 
joritarian right also being protected. 
In sum, according to Tucker, and contra
mendments justify a narrow construction of federal powers. The former 
en the personal rights of individuals are threatened; the latter when the rights 
d powers of states are threatened. And, also contrary to Lash, when Tucker 
ers to “the rights and powers” of the states, he invariably invokes the Tenth 
endment (“the latter of these articles”) rather than the Ninth.123  Finally, 
en Tucker invokes the Ninth, it is solely in reference to “personal” liberties 
 ‘the citizen” or individual rights.  
In the passage twice quoted by Lash, Tucker is merely summarizing this 
ality by using a parallelism, which I 
s. “[T]he powers delegated to the federal government, are, in all cases, 
receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the 
hts [a] of a state or [b] of the people, either [a] collectively, or [b] 
ividually, may be drawn in question.”124 Here “the rights of a state” parallel 
 term “collectively” while “the rights of . . . the people” parallel the term 
dividually.”125 In context, Tucker’s parallelism is obvious unless one has 
ccumbed to the majoritarian difficulty. By expressly asserting that the Tenth 
endment protects the collective rights of a state, Tucker is impliedly 
irming that the Ninth Amendment does not protect any collective rights of 
 people, but is limited to individual rights. 
ONCLUSION: STATE “CONTROL” OF THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 
s that is protected by the Ninth Amendment, constitutional limits on 
al power indirectly preserve and protect whatever majoritarian features are 
rated into state constitutional schemes. So too does Article IV, section 4 
122. Tucker, supra note 112, at app. 151 (emphasis added). 
123. Id. at 308. 
124. Lash, supra note 4, at 919 (quoting Tucker, supra note 112, at app. 154).  
125. Id. The passage could be rephrased to eliminate the potentially confusing 
paralleli  e, in all cases, to 
receive e rights of a state 
collectiv
delegate
that the m
of t
sm as follows: “The powers delegated to the federal government, ar
struction that the instrument will bear, where ththe most strict con
ely or of the people individually, may be drawn in question.” Or “The powers 
d to the federal government, are, in all cases, to receive the most strict construction 
 instru ent will bear, where the collective rights of a state or of the individual rights 
he people may be drawn in question.” 
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uaranteeing “to every state in this Union a republican form of 
vernment.”126 Likewise, the Ninth Amendment protects the unenumerated 
ividual rights of everyone in a state, including those in the majority, against 
uses by the federal government. And according to St. George Tucker, the 
nth Amendment justifies a strict interpretation of the implied powers of 
ngress when the rights and powers of states are affected. But none of these 
nstitutional protections of state or majoritarian power implies a retained right 
 a majority in a state to rule over minorities in violation of the natural 
ividual rights retained by the people. 
However, in addition to his assertions of collective and/or majoritarian 
ts, Lash also repeatedly refers to an altogether different concept: that of 
al and/or majoritarian control of the exercise of the rights retained by the 
ople. Sometimes he refers to local or state control as, for example, when he 
ys that “the fact that some rights are enumerated against the states shall not 
 construed to disparage or deny other rights left under local (state) 
ntrol.”127 Other times he refers to majoritarian control, for example when he 
ys that “all retained rights (individual and otherwise) were left to the control 
 state majorities.”128 Just as a collective right is not the same concept as that 
 a majoritarian right, however, so too local control is not the same as 
joritarian control; and a local power to control an individual right is not the 
me thing as a collective right to local control. 
At some point, all these different formulations of collective or majoritarian 
hts or powers need to be sorted out and supported by pertinent evidence. 
ther than try to reconstruct what Lash is really claiming, let me conclude by 
126. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. 
127. Lash, supra note 4 at 903; see also id. at 920 (“to preserve local control of both 
individual and majoritarian rights”); id. at 922 (“[T]he Ninth and Tenth establish that all 
retained control of the people in the states who may then 
delegate
consti
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ma
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exc
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ord
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id.
the
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 powers and rights are left under the 
 the same to their state governments, or expressly retain them under their state 
tution.”); id. at 928 (“Even in regard to retained unenumerated individual rights, the 
t leaves these under the control of the people in the several states absent an express 
ndate in the Constitution itself.”); id. at 931 (“In addition to reserving certain subjects to 
al control, the Ninth Amendment also counsels against construing federal power as 
lusive of concurrent state authority, unless absolutely necessary.”); id. at 933-34 (“[I]t is 
 text of the Ninth that calls for a limited construction of enumerated federal power in 
er to avoid disparaging the right of the people to keep certain matters under local 
ntrol.”). 
128. Id., at 911; see also id. at 919 (“describing the Ninth Amendment as a provision 
erving all retained rights, individual and majoritarian, to the control of local majorities”); 
 at 920 (“Even those retained rights that are individual in terms of their application against 
 federal government are collective in terms of their being retained under local majoritarian 
trol.”); id. at 924 (“All of the rights now protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
ally fell within the category of rights removed from the federal government and left as 
initial matter under majoritarian state control.”); id. at 915 (“Because ‘retaining’ a right, 
 definition, means leaving that right to the majoritarian control of the people in the states, 
 retained rights are federalist in their operative effect in that they are retained to the 
joritarian control of the people in the several states.”). 
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ring my own views about the powers of federal and state governments to 
ntrol or regulate the exercise of the natural individual rights; powers that are 
nsistent with the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments and the rest of the 
nstitution. 
For reasons t
 to call an individual natural rights interpretation of the Ninth 
endment a “Libertarian reading” of the Ninth Amendment,129 perhaps to 
parage it as formulated to reach results in accordance with what he calls 
bertarian political theory.”130 While the limitations on government powers 
uired by the original meaning of the Constitution as amended may well be 
re protective of individual liberty than the constitutional law currently 
ognized by the Supreme Court, by no means are they perfectly or even 
ically libertarian.  
Under the U.S. Constitution, the fact that a person may possess a natural 
ht does not preclude th
 As St. George Tucker explained, 
the power of regulating the course in which property may be transmitted by 
deed, will, or inheritance; the manner in whic
uries redressed; the right of defining and punishing offences against the 
iety, other than such as fall under the express jurisdiction of the federal 
ernment; all which, and all others of a similar nature are reserved to, and 
y be exercised by the state governments.131 
r example, while Robert Farquhar had a natural right to enter into 
 contracts that ought not be denied or disparaged by the state of 
, this would not prevent Georgia from establishing a general law of 
acts to regulate their making, interpretation, and enforcement. The 
lationship between rights and regulation is reflected in the commonplace 
tement that the exercise of liberties was subject to the law of the land. To 
ese state regulatory powers we must add the power of Congress “[t]o regulate 
mmerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian 
ibes.”132 
This power to regulate the exercise of natural rights applies both to 
umerated and unenumerated rights. The natural retained right of freedom of 
eech133 is con
., fraud and defamation—and with the regulation of rightful exercises of 
129. See id. passim. 
130. Id. at 933. Perhaps this is also why Lash persists in referring to me as “libertarian 
scholar Randy Barnett,” id. at 898 n.11, which would be like identifying Lash or Amar as 
“collectivist” or “majoritarian” scholars, rather than as constitutional scholars who defend a 
collective rights inth Amendment as its original meaning. 
131 c
rig
 reading of the N
. Tu ker, supra note 112, at app. 309. 
132. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
133. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 33-38 (discussing the notes for Madison’s bill of 
hts speech in which he referred to the “natural rights retained as speach”). 
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 in the form of rules governing the time, place, and manner of their 
ercise. So too is an individual right to keep and bear arms consistent with the 
vernment prohibition of the wrongful use of arms, as well as time, place and 
nner regulations of their possession and carry.134 
Lash’s failure to appreciate the difference between a
e individual rights and an unconstitutional power to deny or disparage 
em colors his entire analysis. He says: “A retained right is a right withheld 
m government control. The opposite of a retained right is an assigned 
ht—one delegated to government control.”135 In other words, he seems to 
ew constitutional rights as absolute or as trumps; to recognize an enumerated 
unenumerated right is to remove all government control of its exercise. But, 
 was just explained, this is no more the case with the unenumerated rights 
etained by the people” to which the Ninth Amendment refers than it is with 
e enumerated rights to which the First and Second Amendments refer. 
The ever present danger that the individual rights of the people to keep and 
ar arms or to exercise the freedom of speech will be unjustly infringed 
ts placing the onus on the government to justify its regulations of these 
erties as truly necessary and proper. And the Ninth Amendment’s mandate 
at the same constitutional protection be afforded the other rights retained by 
e people warrants creating what might be called a general “presumption of 
erty.”136 Any such presumption of liberty, however, can be rebutted by a 
fficient showing of necessity and propriety. In a system in which government 
dges are the only independent tribunals available to police the scope of 
vernmental powers, the result will be far from a libertarian nirvana.137 
Therefore, to the extent that the power to regulate the exercise of the rights 
ained by the people was and remains primarily the responsibility of the 
tes, Lash is quite correct that all these rights are subject to the control of state 
ments. The name we have given this power of control is the police 
wer.138 But the police power of states to regulate the rights retained by the 
ople does not give states the right to deny or disparage them any more than 
 power to regulate contracts gives states the power to impair the obligation 
 rightful contracts.139 
134. See Gary E. Barnett, Note, The Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Keep and 
ar Arms, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB
ations of firearms to time,
Be . POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (analogizing reasonable 
regul  place and manner regulations of speech).  
135. Lash, supra note 4, at 911 (citation omitted). 
136
PR
wa
teenth 
Amendm
138
RE
he 
Obligat C
. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
ESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) (explaining why a presumption of liberty is an appropriate 
y to put into affect the original meaning of the Constitution as amended).  
137 t rovisions as the Six. No  to mention such unlibertarian constitutional p
ent. 
. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
V. 429 (2004). 
139. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . make any . . . Law impairing t
ion of ontracts.”). 
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course, under the original Constitution, the federal government had only 
ed jurisdiction to protect the personal rights of the citizen from being 
lated by his or her state government.140 For this reason, at the Founding, the 
ue of states violating natural rights was largely moot at the federal level. But 
is feature of the original constitution was altered by adoption of the 
urteenth Amendment, which stipulated that: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ab
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.141 
A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, Lash tentatively 
a novel and counterintuitive view of the relationship of the Ninth 
endment and the Fourteenth.142 But his hypothesis about the Fourteenth 
mendment is wholly dependent on his claim that the Ninth Amendment 
otects a collective or majoritarian control of individual rights or a collective 
majoritarian right to rule individuals. Unless this claim is first clarified and 
en proven we need not concern ourselves with how his reading of the Ninth 
mendment can be reconciled with the subsequently-adopted Fourteenth 
mendment. By this point, however, I trust fair-minded readers can see just 
w implausible is Kurt Lash’s majoritarian interpretation of the Ninth 
mendment. 
 
 
 
140 The Contracts Clause, id., is one example of an original federal limitation on state 
power. 
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Notice how the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
combines the prohibitory phraseology of the Contracts Clause and First Amendment (“shall 
make no l
Article I
“p r immunities” and the protection of these individual rights against state laws). 
142
.
aw”) with the subject matter scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
V. See BARNETT, supra note 136, at 60-68, 190-97 (discussing the meaning of 
rivileges o
. See generally Lash, supra note 4. 
